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Scenarios of equivalence - The case of quelque
Jacques Jayez and Lucia M. Tovena
Abstract The French existential determiner quelque is examined in relation to the
notion of equivalence. This notion, formalised as Equity in (Jayez and Tovena,
2008), is the explicit characterisation of a widespread intuition concerning free
choice and epistemic items, according to which members of a set are presented
as equivalent with respect to some relevant criterion or dimension. Equivalence is a
unifying notion that enables us to embrace the different aspects of the distribution
of quelque and turn them into a coherent whole.
The paper discusses the epistemic component of quelque and draws attention to
its evidential property, which is exploited in accounting for the subtle interplay be-
tween the determiner and the types of nouns it combines with. It is then argued that
the seeming positive polarity of quelque derives from the conventionalised effect of
a processing interaction between its existential quantifier status and the epistemic
implicature it conveys. By taking into account the pressure of processing mecha-
nisms on the stabilisation of use, we are able to explain the otherwise puzzling fact
that several epistemic determiners with unrelated morphology in different languages
exhibit a converging behaviour with respect to negation. Finally, a closer look at di-
achronic data reveals that the anti-specificity of quelque is present already in the
early stages of the life of the item.1
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1 Introduction
In this article, we look at the French determiner quelque—an existential indefinite
somewhat literary or formal in many of its uses—in relation to the notion of equiv-
alence.2 This notion, formalised as Equity in (Jayez and Tovena, 2008) and already
present in the characterisation of the referentiality of an interpretation provided in
(Jayez and Tovena, 2005), is the explicit characterisation of a widespread intuition
concerning free choice items (FCIs) as well as epistemic items, according to which
members of a set are presented as equivalent with respect to some relevant criterion
or dimension. In this sense, the notion may offer a minimal characterisation of free
choice and epistemic elements across languages.
The notion of Equity is spelled out in section 2, where it is set against the back-
drop of the general discussion on FCIs. Next, we observe that quelque occurs in
several constructions and structures in French, which can be divided into three cat-
egories. Quelque enters subordinating constructions, it can be a negative polarity
determiner, and it can be an epistemic determiner that conveys ignorance. These
cases are examined in the first three subsections of section 3. Their global equiv-
alence profile is underscored. Putative exceptions to the characterisation proposed
for epistemic quelque are defused in two steps in subsection 3.4. First, habituals
are reduced to one more case of using inferential knowledge. Second, the notion
of trope, from the philosophical tradition, is elaborated into two subtypes, i.e. in-
ternal and external tropes, useful to capture the split between abstract nouns like
beauty and courage in combination with quelque. Finally, aspects of the interaction
with negation are discussed in subsection 3.5 and accounted for with the help of the
epistemic properties of quelque. Last, the study of the evolution of this determiner
across time is launched in section 4, where the role of equivalence emerges again.
Section 5 concludes the article.
2 Equivalence among candidates
Over the last twenty years, the ever growing amount of work published on FCIs has
revealed their empirical diversity. It has also raised the question of whether all the
phenomena connected with free choiceness have really something in common. In
this section, we do not claim to provide a definitive answer to this question. More
modestly, we propose that a significant part of the phenomena grouped under the
‘free choice’ label share indeed a common facet, which is a form of equivalence
that we call Equity.3
2 Although our work on free choice and epistemic determiners has progressed since the time of the
original 2008’s version of this paper, we cannot include here all the detailed changes and additions
that would be relevant. So, we will focus on what is essential to the description of quelque.
3 For the sake of clarity, in characterising the intuitively appealing notion of equivalence, we stick
to the terminological choice adopted in previous work (Jayez and Tovena, 2008), where we have
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Intuitively, Equity corresponds to the fact that the members of a set are mutually
‘equivalent’ with respect to some criterion or along some dimension. The use of
any in modal contexts provides a typical illustration. Suppose that (1a) is issued in
a context where the speaker wants the addressee to pick a card from a pack. Then,
any signals that it does not matter which card is picked, or, in other words, that there
is no privileged card (which must be picked) or forbidden card (which must not
be picked). Similarly, if (1b) describes the status of printers within a network, any
emphasises that no printer is out of reach. All cards and all printers are equivalent
with respect to the property of being picked or being reached.
(1) a. Pick any card
b. Any printer can be reached
Far from being a peculiarity of any, the notion of Equity turns out to be an essential
ingredient of the description of many FCIs, under at least three externally different
forms. First, there is referential Equity, which precludes reference to a particular
individual or a particular subset of individuals from a given set (Jayez and Tovena,
2005) and is conducive to modal variation (Giannakidou, 2001; Jayez and Tovena,
2005). Second, Equity is not limited to the referential uses of FCIs. It concerns
also epistemic elements. Epistemic Equity corresponds to ignorance, that is, to the
fact that all individuals are epistemically interchangeable, or, equivalently, that the
precise identity of those that satisfy a given property is unknown (Alonso-Ovalle and
Menéndez-Benito, 2003; Farkas, 2002; von Fintel, 2000; Jayez and Tovena, 2006;
Tredinnick, 2005). This is the phenomenon sometimes also referred to by the term
of ‘referential vagueness’ in recent work. Whether epistemic elements are simply
a particular (epistemic) case of FCIs is debatable. We will propose an answer to
this question in section 3.3.2. Finally, Equity concerns also affective uses of FCIs.
Affective values such as indifference and depreciation are frequently mentioned in
connection with ignorance (von Fintel, 2000; Jayez and Tovena, 2002; Tredinnick,
2005; Van de Velde, 2000).
Equity can be formulated in a very general, noncommittal way. Let S be a set of
situations (alternatives, worlds, etc.) and D a set of individuals. Each individual of
D can occur in a situation of S or not. So, S represents a set of possible choices for
the members of D.
(2) Let S be a set of situations and D a set of individuals, choices(S,D) denotes
the set of sets of pairs 〈s,a〉, where s ∈ S and a ∈ D.
For instance for S = {s1,s2} and D = {a,b}, the members of choices(S,D) can be
described by the following matrix, where each empty cell at (i, j) can be 1 (meaning
that 〈i, j〉 is in the choice) or 0 (meaning that 〈i, j〉 is not in the choice).4
called Equity the combination of the two constraints discussed in this section. The definition of
Equity is recalled in (29) below.
4 If one thinks of situations as worlds, choices amount to complete answers to a constituent ques-
tion, in the partition style of analysis by Groenendijk and Stokhof.
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a b
s1
s2
In this example, choices(S,D) contains 16 possible choices. Borrowing the lan-
guage of modal logic, we use the following abbreviations.
(3) If h ∈ choices(S,D), ✷ha notes the fact that 〈s,a〉 ∈ h for every s ∈ S. ♦ha
notes the fact that 〈s,a〉 ∈ h for some s ∈ S.
For a given choice h, the notion of equivalence can be implemented with the help
of two distinct but compatible constraints that we call No Winner and No Loser.
No Winner says that no individual can be chosen in every possible situation (no
individual is ‘imposed’). No Loser says that no individual can be excluded from
any possible situation (no individual is ‘excluded’). Clearly, the two constraints are
independent since neither one entails the other.5
(4) a. h satisfies No Winner iff ¬✷ha for every a ∈ D.
b. h satisfies No Loser iff ♦ha for every a ∈ D.
Returning to free choiceness, it is straightforward that examples like (1a) are inter-
preted as jointly satisfying No Winner and No Loser. The set of situations S stands
for the possible evolutions of the current situation at speech time. Since every card
can be chosen or left out, no card can be left out in all evolutions (No Loser) and no
card can be chosen in every evolution (No Winner).
Ignorance and indifference signal that the identity of an individual is unknown
or does not matter. Therefore, items that convey that kind of value enforce No Win-
ner. For instance, the French determiner un quelconque can express ignorance as
well as indifference. (5a) entails that the speaker cannot identify the solution that
Paul found. So, for every (reasonable) solution which is a possible candidate, that
is, which satisfies the open proposition ‘Paul found solution x’ at some epistemic al-
ternative, it is not the case that this candidate satisfies the open proposition at every
epistemic alternative (No Winner). Similarly, in (5b), the speaker makes it manifest
that she does not care about which card will be picked, so, if the possible situations
represent all the situations that are compatible with the speaker’s preferences, no
card shows up at every alternative (No Winner).
5 The joint effect of these constraints always rules out the choices where no individual at all is ever
chosen and where all individuals are chosen everywhere, but also a number of intermediary cases,
depending on the cardinality of S and D. In the example in hand, ten more choices are eliminated
and only the following four survive.
a b
s1 0 0
s2 1 1
a b
s1 1 1
s2 0 0
a b
s1 1 0
s2 0 1
a b
s1 0 1
s2 1 0
We remain neutral as to whether these choices are collected at some point into a single object,
be it a conjunction or disjunction of alternatives.
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(5) a. Paul a trouvé une solution quelconque
‘Paul found some solution or other’
b. Tu peux prendre une carte quelconque
‘You may pick some card or other’
Certain FCIs impose No Loser as well (e.g. English any and French n’importe quel
and un quelconque). We will return in more detail to this point in section 3.3.
3 Three quelque and their global equivalence profile
Quelque occurs in several constructions and structures in French. They can be di-
vided into three categories. First quelque enters two different subordinating con-
structions and there is also a companion structure with quel que. Second quelque can
be a negative polarity determiner, labelled quelque-NPI hereafter. Finally, quelque
can be an epistemic determiner that conveys ignorance, labelled quelque-E hereafter.
We consider these three cases in turn.
3.1 Unconditional quelque
Unconditional constructions comprise all those constructions that express the in-
dependence of a proposition with respect to a set of alternatives, as per Zaefferer
(1991), see also (Gawron, 2001; Rawlins, 2008). They are illustrated in (6) for En-
glish. In all cases, the proposition expressed by the main clause, that we have to
change our plans and that the person in question will get a particular office, is true
regardless of which alternative is true in the set of alternatives introduced by the
other clause. In all these structures, an interrogative component seems to be respon-
sible for introducing the alternatives.6
(6) a. Whether you agree or not, we have to change our plans
b. Whether Mary, Joan or Louise will be hired, she will get the office next
to mine
c. Whoever the company will hire, he will get the office next to mine
Quelque is found in two different unconditional constructions, that we describe cur-
sorily. The first is the structure quelque ADJi que NP V-SUB ei [S . . . ], illustrated
in (7).7
6 In addition to differences in the technical implementation of alternatives, the three mentioned
proposals can be distinguished by the importance they assign to scales. Gawron grants a central
role to them, in contrast to Zaefferer and Rawlins.
7 Que is the direct object form of the relative pronoun in French. V-SUB is a predicative verb in
the subjunctive, and ei notes a gap.
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(7) a. Quelque fatigué que Paul soit, il finira le travail
‘However tired Paul is, he will finish the job’
b. Quelque embarrassé que Paul se soit trouvé, il n’a rien dit
‘However embarrassed Paul found himself, he did not say anything’
The second is the structure [XP quelque N]i que [S-SUB . . . ei . . .] [S . . .], illustrated
in (8).
(8) a. Quelque fatigue que Paul ressente, il finira le travail
‘Whatever tiredness Paul may feel, he will finish the job’
b. Pour quelque raison que Paul ait fait ça, son attitude est inadmissible
‘Whatever reason Paul had to do that, his behaviour cannot be tolerated’
These structures are felt as formal. A more current construction is quelα que être-
SUBJα ′ NPα [S . . .], illustrated in (9).
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(9) a. Quelle que soit la fatigue de Paul, il finira le travail
‘However tired Paul is, he will finish the job’
b. Quel que soit son âge, c’est inadmissible
‘No matter how old he is, this cannot be tolerated’
In the three structures, the order between the clause containing quelque and the
[S . . . ] clause is ‘free’. For convenience, only the order [S . . . quelque . . . ] [S . . . ]
is showed. We discuss two aspects of these structures. The first is characterised in
negative terms but is important in the context of the paper. In these constructions,
quelque or quel que do not necessarily convey ignorance. For instance, in (7a), the
speaker may have a very precise knowledge of the degree to which Paul is tired and
of the circumstances that explain his being tired. In (8b), the speaker may know the
reason why Paul behaved the way he did. As for (9b), the age may be overtly given
in the same sentence, as shown by example (10), which is perfectly natural.
(10) Paul n’a que trois ans, mais quel que soit son âge, c’est inadmissible
‘Paul is only three years old, but, no matter how old he is, this cannot be
tolerated’
The second aspect is the particular value conveyed by the unconditional struc-
ture. According to Zaefferer (1991), an unconditional structure deconditionalises
a proposition q, i.e. it converts q into the proposition that the holding of any one
of a given set of propositions P is sufficient for the holding of q, where P exhausts
the set of options that are taken into consideration. Thus, q is unconditional on the
question which one of the members of P happens to be true. With this starting point
in mind, we consider the following examples.
8 Être is the equivalent of the be copula. α and α ′ are sets of agreement features. Specifically, α
includes number, gender and person (set to 3rd), α ′ includes only number and person since French
does not mark gender on a finite verb.
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(11) a. Quel que soit l’entraîneur que l’équipe aura, elle gagnera le champi-
onnat
‘Whatever coach the team will have, they will win the championship’
b. #Quel que soit l’entraîneur compétent que l’équipe aura, elle gagnera
le championnat
‘Whatever competent coach the teamwill have, they will win the cham-
pionship’
The characterisation introduced so far does not seem to predict the contrast be-
tween (11a) and (11b). (11a) entails that the identity of the coach does not affect
the future victory. (11b) entails that the identity of the competent coach does not
affect the future victory. Why should a restriction to competent coaches (instead of
coaches in general) create a difference in acceptability? For instance, compare (11)
to a similar pair with a FCI determiner instead of an unconditional structure. No
contrast is observed in (12).
(12) a. L’équipe gagnera le championnat avec n’importe quel entraîneur
The team will win the championship with any coach
b. L’équipe gagnera le championnat avec n’importe quel entraîneur com-
pétent
The team will win the championship with any competent coach
However, it is possible to account for the contrast in (11) by exploiting the com-
mon intuition of ‘deconditionalisation’ with respect to a set of propositions. We as-
sume for simplicity that unconditionals are based on sets of mutually exclusive alter-
natives, involving exactly one individual each, along the lines of (Rawlins, 2008).
Suppose that we have a set of individuals {a1 . . .an} that provides the values of
coaches and competent coaches for (11a) and (11b). The alternatives proper can be
described by a set of world-assignment pairs as in (13), where ∃! notes the exactly-
one quantifier.9
(13) Alternatives for (11a)
{〈w,g〉|w |= ∃!x(coach(x))&g(x) ∈ {a1 . . .an}&w,g |= coach(x)}
Alternatives for (11b)
{〈w,g〉|w |= ∃!x(coach(x)& competent(x))&g(x) ∈ {a1 . . .an}&
w,g |= coach(x)& competent(x)}
For each alternative relative to (11b), we have that w,g′ 6|= coach(x)&competent(x),
for every g′ such that g′(x) 6= g(x). At this point there are two possibilities. (i) We can
interpret the sentence as meaning that the team will win the championship, provided
it has a competent coach. In this case, the ‘alternatives’ all contain competent(ai)
and it is unclear why the property of competence should be mentioned at all as a
9 If we want to relax the condition that each alternative uses exactly one individual, we can
rephrase the definitions given in (13) in the following way: {〈w,G〉|G ⊆ G& ∀g ∈ G(g(x) ∈
{a1 . . .an}&w,g |= φ(x))}, where G is the set of assignment functions and φ is the property of
interest, i.e. λx.coach(x) or λx.coach(x)& competent(x). We don’t discuss here the choice be-
tween the two options on alternatives because it is mostly irrelevant to our concerns.
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resource for constructing alternatives, since they are constructed only on the basis
of the property of being a coach.10 (ii) We can interpret the sentence as pointing to
alternatives genuinely based on both properties. In that case, we may let in the set
of alternatives situations where there are several coaches but only one is competent.
This is pragmatically odd because a team has in general only one (main) coach. So,
we should eliminate such alternatives. However, we may also let in the alternatives
competent and incompetent non-coaches, which makes unclear again why the prop-
erty of being competent was mentioned in the first place. Summarising, whatever the
interpretation is, we face problems managing the alternatives, which are ill-defined
or implausible. The previous examples are improved when there is a salient set of
competent coaches, among whom one person can be chosen in each alternative.
A similar effect is observed with expressions whose interpretation relies on mu-
tually exclusive alternatives, as in (14). Again, these examples are improved if some
set of competent coaches is highlighted by the context
(14) a. L’identité de l’entraîneur importe peu. De toute façon, ils gagneront le
championnat
’Who the coach is does not matter much. Anyway, they will win the
championship’
b. #L’identité de l’entraîneur compétent importe peu. De toute façon, ils
gagneront le championnat
’Who the competent coach is does not matter much. In any case they
will win the championship’
c. L’entraîneur peut bien être untel ou untel, ça ne change rien
‘The coach may be Mr. So and So, it does not make any difference’
d. #L’entraîneur compétent peut bien être untel ou untel, ça ne change
rien
‘The competent coach may be Mr. So and So, it does not make any
difference’
In the context of this paper, unconditionality can be seen as a particular case of
Equity, since it amounts to presenting all situations of a certain type as equivalent
with respect to the truth of a certain proposition (the ‘conclusion’ of the uncon-
ditional structure). An indirect piece of evidence in favour of the relationship be-
tween Equity and unconditionality is provided by the concessive value, frequently
observed for quelque in unconditional constructions. Since the truth of the con-
clusion remains unaffected by the variation in alternatives, a concessive value can
emerge if the alternatives are ranked along some scale. The speaker then conveys the
idea that the conclusion is true even in those situations where it is the most unlikely,
that is, those situations that are the most unfavourable to the proposition. This raises
the question of whether the concessive value is pragmatic or conventional. One may
postulate that a likelihood scale is conventionally associated with the constructions
10 It is of course possible to mention this property outside of the characterisation of alternatives, as
in L’équipe gagnera le championnat quel que soit l’entraîneur, pourvu qu’il soit compétent (‘The
team will win the championship whoever the coach is, provided he is competent’).
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in hand, as Lee and Horn (1994) have done for any and as Gawron (2001) has pro-
posed for Universal Concessive Conditionals (UCCs) with wh- ever.11 UCCs were
introduced by König (1986), who explicitly appeals to the relation between the pro-
tasis of a conditional referring to ‘a suitable extreme value on some scale’ and the
conditional having a concessive interpretation (König, 1986, p. 238).
However, since concessivity is not always present with unconditional structures
(see (15) and its English counterpart (16)), we prefer a more abstract analysis, based
on the idea of a set of alternatives, parameterising the very general configuration of
Equity in a way specific to unconditional structures.
(15) A – C’est Jean qui a donné le colis
B – Non, c’est Paul
C – Bon, quelle que soit la personne, il faut partir
(16) A – It was John who gave the parcel
B – No, it was Paul
C – Listen, whoever it was, it’s time to go
3.2 quelque-NPI
French has a negative polarity complex determiner quelque N que ce soit, that we
label quelque-NPI. Quelque-NPI is to be found in negative, interrogative and con-
ditional environments (17).
(17) a. Paul n’a pas fait quelque effort que ce soit
‘Paul made no effort whatsoever’
b. Est-ce que Paul a fait quelque effort que ce soit?
‘Did Paul make any effort whatever?’
c. Si Paul fait quelque effort que ce soit, les choses iront mieux
‘If Paul makes any effort whatsoever, the situation will clear up’
It is out in assertive sentences, whether episodic or not (generic, habitual, etc.),
cf. (18).
(18) a. ∗Paul a fait quelque effort que ce soit
‘Paul made any effort whatsoever’
b. ∗Quelque effort que ce soit est toujours louable
‘Any effort whatsoever is always laudable’
c. ∗Habituellement, Paul faisait quelque effort que ce soit
‘Usually, Paul made any effort whatsoever’
The distribution captured in this array of uses may motivate a characterisation as
NPI. One can make sense of it if one sees quelque que ce soit as an end-of-scale
11 UCC is the term useed by Gawron for unconditionals. As mentioned in footnote 6, Gawron, like
Zaefferer and Rawlins, uses alternatives, but his alternatives are ordered rather than flat ones.
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determiner which points to lowest values and requires downward-monotone envi-
ronments to warrant pragmatic inference, see (Horn, 1972, 1989; Fauconnier, 1975;
Israel, 2001). Since quelque alone (without the que ce soit part) has a very different
distribution (see next section), the source of scalarity is probably the que ce soit part.
This part creates a rhetorical effet of widening or emphasis, maybe because of the
subjunctive or of a simple effect of insistence, as confirmed by the fact that (19a,b)
are perceived as weaker than (19c,d).
(19) a. Il n’a fait aucun effort
b. Il n’a pas voulu faire d’effort
c. Il n’a fait aucun effort que ce soit
d. Il n’a pas voulu faire quelque effort que ce soit
Superficially, quelque-NPI implements No Loser. In fact, it behaves as a universal
quantifier that takes scope over the operators it can combine with. The relevant
operators are non-veridical in the sense of Zwarts (1995) (see also (Giannakidou,
1998)). A propositional operator Op is non-veridical when Op(φ) 6⇒ φ . Negation,
the question operator and the conditional operator are well-known examples of such
operators. For space reasons, we do not discuss here the different possibilities that
are available at the moment to capture operator-sensitivity in the syntax-semantics
interface12. We limit ourselves to a general, theory-independent, definition, given
in (20).
(20) Assume that we have a construction Op([S . . .quel N que ce soit. . .]), where
Op is a non-veridical operator, N expresses property P and [S . . .] proposi-
tion φ . We define the domain of N-objects, DP to be {x | P(x)}, that is, the
domain of individuals that satisfy the property P denoted by the noun. Let
x be the variable bound by quelque-NPI in the logical form of φ . Then, the
construction communicates that an interpretation M is appropriate only if,
for every g such that g(x) ∈ DP, M,g |= Op(φ(x)).
3.3 quelque-E: Ignorance and evidentiality
When it occurs as an autonomous determiner, quelque precludes an interpretation
where the referent of the NP is identified by the relevant epistemic agent. Further-
more, it is also an evidential determiner, in that it qualifies the mode of information
available to the agent13. Its anti-specificity is a side-effect of evidentiality. In or-
der to distinguish it from the two previous cases, the quelque determiner is noted
quelque-E, where E is mnemonic for epistemic and evidential.
Let us consider ignorance first. Quelque requires that the epistemic agent does
not know which individual satisfies the description provided by the sentence. First,
12 See (Shan, 2004) and (Kratzer, 2005) for examples of the ‘continuation-based’ style vs. the
‘pointwise function application’ style.
13 This section draws on (Jayez and Tovena, 2008).
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ignorance can be defined as in (21), where it is said that agent A does not know
which individual satisfies the description ∆ if and only if no individual satisfies
∆ in all the epistemic alternatives she entertains, simplifying a little the issue and
adapting from (Jayez and Tovena, 2006).
(21) Let A be an agent and ∆(x) a set of formulas in the free variable x. Note
M,a |= ∆(x) the fact that M,gxa |= ∆(x) for some g. At w, A does not know
which individual satisfies ∆(x) whenever there is no a such that, for all the
epistemic alternatives wi of A in w, wi,a |= ∆(x).
One might object that this definition of ignorance is not exactly what we need. It
is compatible with a situation where A believes that no individual satisfies ∆ . Intu-
itively, one does not describe a situation where an agent believes that no individual
satisfies property ∆ as an ‘ignorance’ situation. This intuition does not raise a mere
terminological issue. We will see in section 3.5.1 how to address this concern in a
principled way, without modifying (21).
An alternative, more syntactic definition, is given in (22).
(22) Let A be an agent and ∆(x) a set of formulas in the free variable x. At
w, A does not know which individual satisfies ∆(x) whenever ¬∃x(w |=
✷Bel,A∆(x))
Then, quelque specifically requires that the agent does not know which individual
satisfies the description provided by the sentence, as defined in (23).
(23) C-ignorance (after (Jayez and Tovena, 2008))
For a (modal) tripartite form Op([quelque-E]x[P][P′]), where Op is a (pos-
sibly null or complex14) modal operator, an interpretation assigned to an
agent A is appropriate only if it is compatible with the fact that A does not
know which individual satisfies Op(P(x)&P′(x)).
Constraint (23) accounts for the oddity of (24), for instance, where the value of x is
supposed to be unknown to the speaker, who is the default epistemic agent, although
the very same speaker is most probably able to identify the friend she met.
(24) ??Hier, j’ai rencontré quelque amie
(23) is a No Winner constraint. If S is the set of epistemic alternatives, and the
set of individuals considered is the denotation of P, i.e. P is the restriction set,
choices(S,P) is defined by: {h|〈s,a〉 ∈ h iff a satisfies P and P′ in s}. Then (23) for-
bids ✷ha for every a in the restriction.
Next, the epistemic agent cannot use perceptual or hearsay evidence to get the
existential proposition corresponding to the sentence containing quelque. This ban
concerns the source of information, hence it is evidential in nature. The constraint
can be expressed in positive terms by saying that quelque marks inferential eviden-
14 We call a modal operator ‘complex’ when it is a stack of elementary modal operators, as when
one uses BelaKbBela[φ ] to code ‘a believes that b knows that a believes that φ .
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tiality, as the ultimate source of information is an inferential process by the speaker,
see (25).15
(25) C-inference (Jayez and Tovena, 2008)
A form [quelque]x [P] [P′] is appropriate only under interpretations where
the epistemic agent infers, i.e. has no direct evidence, that ∃x(P&P′).
Note that this does not prevent the speaker from feeding an inferential process
with perceptual or hearsay evidence, e.g. inferring something from what she sees.
Furthermore, no explicit independent marking of evidentiality in the clause is re-
quired. Whenever an inferential evidential interpretation is available, quelque is fine,
see (26).
(26) Il y a de la lumière dans le bureau; quelque idiot a oublié d’éteindre
‘The light is on in the office; some idiot forgot to switch it off’
Note also that quelque does not commit the speaker to a particular modal force, as
shown by (27).16
(27) a. Yolande a peut-être rencontré quelque ami
‘Perhaps Yolanda met some friend or other’
b. Yolande a nécessairement rencontré quelque ami
‘Yolanda necessarily met some friend or other’
3.3.1 Connections between the constraints
As mentioned above, ignorance and evidentiality, as expressed in C-ignorance (23)
and C-inference (25), are not related in some way such as asymmetric or mutual
entailment. The entailment from C-ignorance to C-inference does not go through. If
the relevant agent A does not know which individual satisfies description ∆ , gener-
ally she does not have direct access to this piece of information, but indirect access
is not barred. As for the opposite direction, suppose that agent A can infer that some
individual satisfies ∆ in a situation s. A might be in a position to infer which indi-
vidual satisfies ∆ . Then, situation s would violate C-ignorance.
But the conclusion that there is no logical relation between C-ignorance and
C-inference is not the end of the story, since the two constraints are related prag-
matically. When a situation conforms to C-inference, using an indefinite makes the
ignorance interpretation most plausible, as evidenced by the contrast in (28). While
(28b) is not impossible, it is more difficult to interpret than (28a).
(28) a. Yolande a rencontré une amie, Louise
‘Yolanda met a friend, Louise’
15 We follow Aikhenvald (2005) in assuming that evidentiality is about the linguistic marking of
the source of information, not of its validity or reliability.
16 The relation of evidentiality to modality is a well-known open issue. We do not base evidentiality
on modal status.
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b. # Yolande a dû rencontrer une amie, Louise
‘Yolanda must have met a friend, Louise’
3.3.2 Ignorance and Equity
Following the strong characterisation of free choiceness defended in (Jayez and
Tovena, 2006, 2008) and recalled in (29), quelque does not qualify as an FC item,
since it obeys No Winner but not No Loser, see (30).
(29) Equity A tripartite form [FCI] [P] [P′] is compatible with an interpreta-
tion I only if:
A. any member of P can be P′ under interpretation I (No Loser constraint)
B. any member of P can be ¬P′ under interpretation I (No Winner con-
straint)
(30) a. Yolande a probablement rencontré quelque amie, qui n’était pas Marie
‘Yolanda probably met some friend or other, who was not Mary’
b. ??Yolande a probablement rencontré quelque amie, Marie
‘Yolanda probably met some friend or other, (namely) Mary’
The fact that quelque obeys No Winner is predicted by C-ignorance. As for No
Loser, there is no reason why quelque should conform to it if its sensitivity to igno-
rance is a consequence of its evidential side, as we argue.
However, if we base the definition of free choiceness on Equity only, the presence
of a constraint of ignorance gets more weight and quelque can then be seen as an
FC item. There are two options at this point. One may think that the distinction is
merely a terminological matter, or insist that Free Choice Items must be intuitively
connected with a choice among individuals and that this requirement leads one to
impose No Winner, in order to preserve the possibility of unrestricted choices.
3.4 Fine-tuning the E profile of quelque-E
In this section we discuss two seeming violations of the constraints C-ignorance
and C-inference. In the case of habituals, the latter constraint seems to be violated.
In the case of abstract mass nouns, both constraints seem to be flouted.17
3.4.1 Habituals
Culioli (1982) observed that quelque is fine in habituals, see (31). Can the working
of constraints C-ignorance and C-inference predict this behaviour? Habitual sen-
tences obey C-ignorance, as shown by (32).
17 This section draws on (Jayez and Tovena, 2008).
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(31) L’après-midi, elle allait habituellement voir quelque ami
‘In the afternoon, she usually visited some friend or other’
(32) ??A l’époque, je voyais toujours Yolande avec quelque amie, Marie
‘At that time, I used to see Yolanda with some friend or other, Mary’
But quelque is fine in habituals where no inference seems to be drawn, see (31)
where C-inference seems to be violated because the epistemic agent may have wit-
nessed the events she refers to. In effect, the crucial factor in habituality is the exis-
tence of some sort of inference from particular occasions to a regularity. Habituality
judgements present a series of particular occasions as a law-like repetition. Under
this view, C-inference is not violated in (31) since the speaker infers the habitual
proposition. On the contrary, a limited non-inferential repetition is expected not to
be compatible with quelque, see (33).
(33) ?J’ai vu sept fois Yolande rencontrer quelque ami
‘I saw Yolanda meet some friend or other seven times’
3.4.2 Tropes
In non-inferential episodic sentences, quelque, combined with count nouns or con-
crete mass nouns, apparently produces a result that is not as good as when it com-
bines with abstract mass nouns, see the contrast in (34). The abstract mass nouns
under consideration denote external qualities (beauty), feelings (irritation) and dis-
positions (intelligence).
(34) a. ∗Yolande a bu quelque eau
‘Yolanda drank some water’
b. Yolande a montré quelque courage.
‘Yolanda showed some courage’
c. Il y a quelque hypocrisie à prétendre cela.
‘There is some hypocrisy in this claim’
Second, as noted in (Jayez and Tovena, 2002), with such nouns, there is a diminu-
tive flavour. In this, quelque is similar to un certain ‘a certain’, see (35).
(35) a. Yolande a montré un certain courage.
‘Yolanda showed some courage’
b. Il y a une certaine hypocrisie à prétendre cela.
‘There is some hypocrisy in this claim’
For instance, in (34b) and (35b), the speaker implies that she is not sure that Yolanda
showed courage to a high degree or in a strong form. This corresponds to a Q-
implicature (Horn, 1989) triggered by the indefinite. By indicating that Yolanda
exhibited a particular degree or form of courage, the speaker implicates that, for all
she knows, Yolanda did not show higher degrees or clearer forms of courage. How-
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ever, un certain and quelque no longer behave the same when they are combined
with some abstract nouns, as illustrated in (36).
(36) a. Deux individus [. . .] qui se caractérisaient par une certaine laideur18
‘Two persons [. . .] who were characterised by a certain ugliness’
b. #Deux individus [. . .] qui se caractérisaient par quelque laideur
c. Il avait une certaine claudication quand il marchait
‘He had a certain limp when he walked’
d. #Il avait quelque claudication quand il marchait
The NP complements in (36) denote particularised properties exhibited in partic-
ular spatio-temporal settings. These instantiations of properties are usually analysed
as tropes (Williams, 1953; Campbell, 1990; Maurin, 2002; Moltmann, 2007), i.e.
particular entities that can enter similarity classes corresponding to abstract proper-
ties, like Yolanda’s kindness (in the kindness class) or the colour of my car (in the
colour class).
For contrasts like those in (36), we set up a new distinction into external and
internal tropes. External tropes are directly observed by agents. This is the case for
ugliness or limp. Internal tropes correspond to internal states or processes of which
only certain effects can be directly observed. For instance, courage and hypocrisy
may show in behaviour (language, gestures, actions, etc). An agent who witnesses
the symptoms of an internal trope may not know what trope it is. This distinction
between a trope and its manifestation makes room for an inference from the latter
to the former. In the terms of (25), the speaker infers that some trope exists.
Note that the distinction between two kinds of tropes has lexical correlates, as
exemplified in (37).
(37) a. ??Marie a montré de la beauté / laideur
‘Mary showed beauty / ugliness’
b. Marie a montré du courage / de l’intelligence
‘Mary showed courage /intelligence’
3.5 Interaction with negation
3.5.1 Computing implicatures under negation
Quelque has a particular profile with respect to negation (Corblin, 2004). It exhibits
a behaviour similar to that of some and other positive polarity items (PPI), (e.g.
Baker, 1970; Szabolcsi, 2004). First, it is infelicitous in the immediate scope of an-
tiadditive operators, whose definition is recalled in (38), as shown in (39). Example
(39) is anomalous if quelque has narrow scope, thus negation seems to work as an
antilicensor for quelque.
18 Excerpt from: http://blog.lefilmfrancais.com/index.php?2006/05/25/2888-paolo-sorrentino-
realisateur-de-lamico-di-famiglia
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(38) O is antiadditive =d f O(a∨b) = O(a)∧O(b)
(39) Yolande n’a pas dû trouver quelque fichier
‘Yolanda must have not found some file’
??[neg > quelque] vs. [quelque > neg]
Next, wherever negation is extraclausal (40a), or there is another NPI-intervener,
e.g. toujours in (40b), or the combination of clausemate negation with quelque is
in the scope of a higher operator, e.g. (40c), then quelque is fine. Again, this is
reminiscent of the standard behaviour of PPI antilicensors.
(40) a. Je ne pense pas que Yolande ait trouvé quelque fichier
‘I don’t think that Yolanda has found some file’
⇒ I don’t think that Yolanda has found any file
b. Yolande ne trouvait pas toujours quelque excuse
‘Yolanda didn’t always find some excuse’
⇒ Sometimes, Yolanda didn’t find any excuse
c. Je suis étonné que Yolande n’ait pas trouvé quelque fichier
‘I am surprised that Yolanda didn’t find some file’
Quelque can also occur in the scope of a negative quantifier like personne (‘nobody’)
or –more marginally– rien (‘nothing’).
(41) a. Personne n’a fait quelque remarque
‘Nobody did some commenting’
b. En général, rien dans son attitude ne suscite quelque critique
‘In general, nothing in his behaviour causes some criticism’
Moreover, as noted by Baker, antilicensors have the special property of seeing
their effect ‘undone’ by another antilicensor stacked upon them, see (42). We will
adopt the often used term of rescuing in such cases.
(42) a. Je ne pense pas que Yolanda n’ait pas fait quelque remarque
b. I don’t think that Yolanda didn’t make some remark
Observations of this kind have led Szabolcsi (2004) to propose an analysis in terms
of feature activation, that we will not discuss here. Instead of arguing for or against
some form of licensing and antilicensing, we take the behaviour of quelque de-
scribed in this subsection to be an instance of the more general problem of comput-
ing implicatures. Two pieces of evidence add support to this line of analysis. First,
quelque and some are very similar as to their behaviour with respect to negation.
They also share the ignorance profile that we have described with the help of con-
straint (23), see (Farkas, 2002).19 Second, the convergence with the data in (43),
19 The crosslinguistic set of items with this type of behaviour is broader. For instance, Spanish algo
(‘something’), akin to algún, has a very similar distribution. See (Alonso-Ovalle and Menéndez-
Benito, 2003) for the epistemic character of algún.
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where we use the French complex determiner je ne sais quel, lit. ‘I don’t know
what’, can hardly be accidental.20
(43) a. Yolande n’a pas trouvé je ne sais quel fichier
b. Je ne pense pas que Yolande n’ait pas trouvé je ne sais quel fichier
Examples (43a) and (43b) have the same readings as their counterparts with quelque.
In particular, the paraphrase ‘Yolanda didn’t find any file’ is not available for (43a)
whereas it is for (43b). Again, it is striking that this (transparently) ignorance-based
determiner patterns with quelque and some.
Can we account for this double parallelism? In (Jayez and Tovena, 2008), we
have proposed that the epistemic restrictions on quelque (C-ignorance and C-
inference) are a conventional implicature, in the sense of Potts (2005). The seman-
tics of quelque is thus divided into two parts. The first one concerns the at-issue
content, in the sense of Potts, and is an existential quantifier. The second one is the
implicature. For clarity, we first use a semi-formal expression, where the at-issue
content and the implicature are linked by a free variable y.
(44) quelque P P′:
a. at issue content = φ : ∃x(x= y&P(x)&P′(x))
b. conventional implicature = y is not identified and φ is only inferred
Conventional implicatures have a projection behaviour analogous to that of presup-
positions. For instance they are not affected by negation and interrogation. Follow-
ing the general direction of Potts’ analysis, we assume that expressions that have
a projective content, such as a presupposition or conventional implicature, can be
represented as a product 〈at-issue content, projective content〉. Under this format,
quelque can be represented as (45).
(45) [[quelque]] = λP,P′. 〈P(x)&P′(x),
no-direct-evidenceA(P(x)&P′(x))&¬∃x(✷Bel,A[P(x)&P′(x)])〉
Suppose that a negative operator is applied to the representation in (45). It bears
only on the first term of the pair (at-issue content), thus entailing that there is no
individual that satisfies the restriction and the scope, giving the result in (46).
(46) λP,P′. 〈¬(P(x)&P′(x)),
no-direct-evidenceA(P(x)&P′(x))&¬∃x(✷Bel,A[P(x)&P′(x)])〉
Why should this be offending? The fact that an agent has no direct evidence of φ and
does not know which individual satisfies φ does not contradict ¬φ . So, it is unlikely
that the solution to our problem is straightforwardly truth-conditional. In contrast,
let us consider a (neo-)Gricean solution based on lexical alternatives. It is often
assumed that, given a set of lexical competitors which are all truth-conditionally
20 French has also pronominal forms such as je ne sais qui / quoi / où / quand / comment / pourquoi
/ PPinterrog, ‘I don’t know who / what / where / when / how / why’, which have the same distribution
as the determiner.
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compatible with the situation to be described, the choice of an item over the others is
significant in at least two ways. The item may carry a presupposition or implicature
that is satisfied or has to be conveyed to the hearer. Alternatively, it may be the case
that the item does not carry a presupposition or implicature carried by at least one
other item in the set, thus its use may convey the presumption that the presupposition
or implicature in question is not satisfied. The reader is referred to (Spector, 2007)
and (Sauerland, 2008) for some illustrations.
In the case of quelque, it is clear that, when compared to a standard indefinite
like un in French, there is no point in using quelque apart from the aim of com-
municating that the epistemic limitations it conveys are satisfied. Consider now the
system of truistic constraints in (47), which express that an agent who believes that
no individual satisfies φ has no direct evidence that φ is satisfied at all (47a) and
does not believe that a particular individual satisfies φ (47b).
(47) a. ✷Bel,A¬∃xφ(x) ⇒ no-direct-evidenceA(φ(x))
b. ✷Bel,A¬∃xφ(x) ⇒ ¬∃x(✷Bel,Aφ(x))
If we assume that an agent A who asserts the proposition that no individual satis-
fies φ is taken to believe precisely such a proposition, we conclude that, by using
quelquewith a clausemate negation, A chooses an item whose implicature is entailed
by the at-issue content she communicates. Why would A select quelque in the first
place, since its implicature is guaranteed and cannot be doubted unless one cancels
the at-issue content, which is impossible without an explicit correction? Either the
implicature is redundant or the at-issue content is challenged. Both cases make the
interpretation difficult or even impossible.
The implicature-based idea may be specified in two markedly different ways.
The allergy of ignorance determiners to negation might be the result of an on-line
pragmatic inference, or else it might be a conventionalised property, which proba-
bly derives from a pragmatic tension between the negated at-issue content and the
implicature, but has been ‘frozen’ in usage. In the following, we are going to argue
in favour of the latter option and we start by discussing the former option first.
Suppose we were to assign the anomaly of epistemic determiners in the scope
of clausemate negation to a form of pragmatic on-line reasoning. In addition to the
usual risk of making overly strong predictions across languages, we would face a
fundamental problem. As we saw above, epistemic determiners are possible when
they occur in a non-negative embedded clause (40a) or in the scope of a negative
quantifier (41). To get a clear idea, consider a simple example like It is not possible
that Yolanda found some file. This example entails that, in every accessible world
relative to the possibility modality, Yolanda didn’t find any file. So, certainly, the
speaker believes that Yolanda didn’t find any file. As a result, the constraints in
(47) apply and predict that epistemic determiners have their implicature trivially
entailed by the at-issue content sentence. Even in those cases where the implicature
is not entailed but rather implied, one may wonder why the speaker would bother
communicating an implicature which is anyway satisfied by another implicature
conveyed by her discourse. For instance, with I don’t think that Yolanda found some
file, although I don’t explicitly deny that Yolanda found a file, I imply that it is very
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unlikely to me. So why should I bother to indicate that the files that have been found
are unknown, since they don’t even exist? In other terms, it seems that in many
cases of higher clause negation, the implicature is as superfluous as with clausemate
negation. Therefore, there is no reason why the latter configuration, where epistemic
determiners are problematic, should be less appropriate than the former, where the
same determiners are not or are significantly less so. One can extend the argument
to negative quantifiers. Clearly, with Nobody made some remark, the inference or
ignorance implicature is irrelevant since, to repeat, no remark was made.
A second reason to doubt that we have an on-line pragmatic effect is the basic
(but important) observation that certain pronouns deriving from epistemic determin-
ers (i) have a distribution similar to that of their parent determiners but (ii) do not
convey an epistemic implicature. This is the case for the quelque series, quelqu’un,
quelque chose, quelque part, and its some counterpart somebody, something, some-
where.
(48) a. Yolanda a rencontré quelqu’un, son prof de gym
b. Yolanda met somebody, her gym coach
c. ?Yolanda n’a pas rencontré quelqu’un
d. ?Yolanda didn’t meet somebody
Finally, we note that a similar distribution is observed with N-words like personne
(‘nobody’) or rien (‘nothing’). They are incompatible with verbal negation and com-
patible with higher clause negation and negative quantifiers.21 We are not aware of
any implicature-based treatment of N-words. If an account that captures the similar-
ities between epistemic determiners and N-words is felt desirable, it is dubious that
it can be based on an on-line epistemic implicature.
(49) a. ??Yolanda n’a pas vu personne / rien vu
‘Yolanda didn’t see nobody / nothing’
b. Il n’est pas vrai que Yolanda n’a vu personne / rien vu
‘It is not true that Yolanda saw nobody / nothing’
c. Personne n’a rien dit
‘Nobody said nothing’
May mean: ‘everybody said something’ (double negation) or ‘nobody
said anything’ (negative concord)
Let us now explore the option of viewing the allergy of ignorance determiners to
negation as a conventionalised property. Following the general architecture pos-
tulated in (Vasishth et al., 2008), we propose a general constraint, formulated in
(50) below. This constraint uses the notion of retrieval. Recent theories of sen-
21 For negative quantifiers, we ignore the orthogonal issue of negative concord in French, see
(Corblin and Tovena, 2001, 2010; de Swart, 2010) on this question.
Leaving negative concord considerations aside, notice that sentence (49a) is marginal. If ac-
cepted, it belongs to a colloquial register and has only a double negation reading. On the contrary,
(49b) is acceptable and belongs to standard French, and only has a double negation reading. As an
aside, recall that ne in the subordinate clause in (49b) does not contribute negation in everyday’s
French.
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tence processing (Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky, 2009; Vasishth and
Lewis, 2006) distinguish between (forward) expectation and retrieval. Typically, a
morpheme creates an expectation when it is perceived as incomplete and forward-
looking, for instance because it lacks an argument or an attachment site (for an
adjunct). Retrieval concerns incomplete morphemes that are backward-looking, for
instance verbs that lack their subject. In sentences of the form ‘It is not true that
S’, the matrix clause expects an embedded clause. Negation is treated at the level
of the matrix clause and the embedded clause is treated independently, except (i)
if it contains an item that triggers a retrieval or (ii) if the matrix clause puts some
constraint on the embedded clause. Case (i) is illustrated by NPIs, which look for a
licensor on their left, and may find it in a matrix clause (It is not true that Yolanda
saw anybody). Case (ii) is illustrated by tense/mood concord phenomena in verbal
systems.
Concerning NPIs and PPIs (jointly referred to as XPIs), we follow Vasishth et al.
(2008) in assuming that XPIs in general trigger a retrieval of negative or positive
elements on their left. For example, when a PPI is encountered, certain ‘relevant’
elements on its left are checked in order to see whether they have a [+positive] fea-
ture, where ‘relevance’ may depend on the PPI and/or the grammar of the language
under consideration. We assume that PPIs must check verbs and NPs in a family
of languages including English and French. It has been observed that XPIs can be
‘licensed’, that is, give rise to acceptance by subjects and to normal reaction times,
by ‘incorrect’ licensors, which have the required feature but do not c-command the
XPI, provided the pseudo-licensor is sufficiently near to the XPI (Drenhaus et al.,
2005; Vasishth et al., 2008). This suggests that proximity is an essential factor in
licensing (or the illusion of licensing). Constraint (50) allows a PPI to retrieve the
necessary positive feature locally. It is deliberately limited since we lack experimen-
tal cross-linguistic evidence.
(50) In (at least) certain languages, the retrieval of the [+positive] feature can be
done locally.
Constraint (50) predicts that the only case where a PPI is excluded is in the im-
mediate scope of a verbal negation, for the languages where it applies. Concerning
double negation, if the two negations cancel, the retrieval gets a [+positive] feature.
The net result depends on the success of the cancellation. We expect, for instance,
that a long distance cancellation is more problematic, as confirmed by the contrast
in (51). This is due to the fact that forward expectation and retrieval are affected by
memory decay, a fact which may lead a subject to lose interpretation resources in
the course of processing.
(51) a. Je ne pense pas que Yolande n’ait pas remarqué quelque chose
‘I don’t think that Yolanda didn’t notice something’
b. ?Je ne pense pas que Paul croit que Marie a dit que Yolande n’a pas
remarqué quelque chose
‘I don’t think that Paul believes that Mary said that Yolanda didn’t see
something’
Scenarios of equivalence - The case of quelque 21
Summarising our claims, we have argued that it is unlikely that the observed pattern
results from an on-line calculation of implicatures. However, we have also argued
that, in the case of epistemic determiners, it is the epistemic implicature which is
responsible for their positive polarity profile, which has been grammaticised and
is subject to general limitations on retrieval distance. We refer the reader to (Jayez
and Tovena, 2008) for additional comments and to (Jayez and Tovena, 2010a) for
a discussion of different patterns of interaction between at-issue and non-at-issue
content.
3.5.2 Further questions about negative contexts
The approach to the quelque determiner presented in the previous subsection leaves
open the issue of the status of quelque N que ce soit and quelque chose/un/part
vis-à-vis negation. First, note that que ce soit can be used to strengthen (widening)
negative determiners or pronouns like aucun (no) or personne (nobody) (52). Very
generally, it demands an NPI environment (53).22 However, unexpectedly, example
(53b), containing the adverb of sentential negation pas, is not entirely natural for
all speakers. This is unexpected because sentential negation is the prototypical NPI
licensor.
(52) a. Paul n’a eu aucun remord (que ce soit)
‘Paul didn’t have any regret’
b. Paul n’a vu personne (que ce soit)
‘Paul did not see anybody’
(53) a. ??Paul a dû avoir quelque remord que ce soit
‘Paul must have felt any regret’
b. % Paul n’a pas eu quelque remord que ce soit23
c. Paul a-t-il eu quelque remord que ce soit?
‘Did Paul feet any regret whatsoever?’
d. Si Paul a eu quelque remord que ce soit, ...
‘If Paul felt any regret whatsoever, ...’
Second, as for quelque chose/un/part, the following contrast is unexpected too,
which shows that the tag que ce soit diminishes the grammatical status of the sen-
tence instead of improving it.
(54) a. Personne n’a vu quelque chose / quelqu’un
‘Nobody saw anything’
b. Personne n’a été quelque part
‘Nobody went anywhere’
c. Paul n’a pas vu quelque chose / quelqu’un
[wide scope preferred: there is something, somebody ... ]
22 The situation does not seem to be entirely parallel for quel qu’il soit, that we leave aside.
23 The sign ‘%’ marks variation among speakers.
22 Jacques Jayez and Lucia M. Tovena
d. Paul n’a pas été quelque part
[wide scope preferred]
e. ?Paul n’a pas vu quelque chose que ce soit
f. Je doute que Paul ait vu quelque chose
‘I doubt that Paul saw anything’
In short, one can observe that, although in general i) que ce soit improves sentences
that provide an NPI environment, and ii) quelque resists the combination with stan-
dard negation in all cases, this is true to various degrees. In order to make sense
of these data, one has to realise that quelque chose is not markedly different from
un N (a N), as confirmed by the data in (55)–(56). The sentences in (55) show the
contrast between acceptable de N and marginal un N in the scope of clausemate
negation pas, and the sentences in (56) show that un N is fully grammatical under
higher clause negation, i.e. when pas is in the superordinate clause (56a), or when
clausemate negation is expressed by an N-word (56b).
(55) a. Paul n’a pas eu d’accident quand il était jeune
‘Paul had no accidents when he was young’
b. ??Paul n’a pas eu un accident quand il était jeune
[intended: Paul had no accidents. OK with (i) a denial interpretation or
(ii) an emphatic24 interpretation: ‘not a single’]
c. Dans le menu a 10 euros, il n’y a pas de dessert
‘In the menu at 10 euros, there is no dessert’
d. ??Dans le menu à 10 euros, il n’y a pas un dessert
[intended: no dessert. OK under an emphatic interpretation ‘not a sin-
gle’]
‘In the menu at 10 euros, there isn’t a dessert’
(56) a. Je ne pense pas que Paul ait eu un accident quand il était jeune
[no emphatic reading required]
‘I don’t think that Paul had an accident when he was young’
b. C’est bizarre, dans aucun menu il n’y a un dessert
[no emphatic reading required]
‘It is odd, all the menus do not have dessert’
In these examples, the cardinal reading ‘one’ of un is involved when necessary, in
view of the context, in order to allow a combination with negation. Since this reading
is not available with quelque chose, the denial interpretation is the only option in
cases parallel to (55). For instance, the sentence Il n’est pas arrivé quelque chose à
Paul quand il était jeune is strange or is interpreted as a denial.
Thus, quelque chose behaves like a standard indefinite in French, minus the car-
dinal reading. This leads us to conclude that quelque chose is NOT quelque + chose
in modern French. The variation on examples like (53b) might be attributed to the
coexistence of two structures. Some speakers perceive a collocation of the form
quelque N que ce soit with an NPI behaviour, and accept the sentence. Others see
24 A concessive reading in other terminologies: ‘not even one’.
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the sentence as a combination of quelque plus a negative polarity tag que ce soit.
This analysis may trigger a semantic conflict since the two parts have different con-
straints with respect to negative environments.
4 Remarks on the evolution of quelque
In this section, we present some facts and questions in relation with the evolution of
quelque in Old and Middle French. We have used texts and excerpts from 1100 to
1550, drawn from the two databases Base du Français Médiéval (BFM) and Fran-
text.25 We will comment only on the results from BFM, because they concern an
earlier period than Frantext and the data in Frantext are not essentially different as
to the types of use. The bulk of the texts spans the 1350-1550 period. Our goal is to
discuss the main uses of quelque and see whether they fit and, if so, how, into the
general picture that emerges from the previous sections.
4.1 Origin
It is tempting to see quelque as the aggregation of an existing construction: quel N
que. According to Buridant (2000, § 493, p. 598), the combination quel que initially
had two properties. i) It belonged to a general system of relative-paired expressions
(and it is called relatif en emploi couplé ‘relative in a paired usage’ by Buridant),
where a relative pronoun has an indefinite-like form as antecedent. Together, they
constitute an indefinite relative clause that tends to freeze into a fixed form (called
locution couplée à antécédent en ‘quel’ ‘paired expression with quel as antecedent’
by Buridant). ii) It had a concessive value. For Buridant, the structure of quel que is
as in (57).
(57) quel N
antecedent
que S
rel. clause
The reason for analysing que as a relative pronoun, rather than the complementizer
que, is the existence of alternating forms quel qui (subject morphology) / que (di-
rect object morphology) / où (locative morphology), see (58).26 Beside quel and its
animate/inanimate variants, other antecedents are que and quant (how much/what),
25 Access to Frantext can be obtained through a subscription procedure, see http://www.
frantext.fr/. The original texts of the BFM http://bfm.ens-lyon.fr/ are available
only to the members of the Elico project, see http://elico.linguist.jussieu.fr/.
26 The examples of this section include (a) the text, as found in the BFM or in Frantext, (b) the name
of the author or of the work—if the author is unknown, (c) the date provided by the BFM or by
Frantext, (d) an approximate translation in modern French, (e) an approximate English translation.
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see the examples (59)27 from Buridant. The possible antecedents all look like wh-
elements, although Buridant does not specify it.
(58) et en quel lieu ou il soit en avroilt il molt grant duel, s’il le savoit [BFM,
Lancelot-Graal or Lancelot en prose, unknown author, beginning of 13th
century]
‘et en en quelque lieu qu’il soit il en aurait grande douleur s’il le savait’
‘and, in whichever place he would be, he would have much pain if he knew’
(59) a. Tant ala que mons, que valees,//Que grans, que petites jornees,//Qu’en
France vint a que que paine [Buridant, LettrePJ]
‘Il parcourut si longtemps et les montaignes et les vallées, par des
grandes et des petites étapes quotidiennes, qu’il arriva en France au
prix de grands efforts’
‘He went over mountains and valleys for so long, in long and short
daily stretches, that he reached France with great efforts’
b. Oblié ont et tot perdu//Quan qu’il avoient fait lessus [Buridant, Eneas]
‘Elles ont perdu le moindre souvenir de tout ce qu’elles avaient fait là-
haut’
‘They have lost any memory of what they did up there’
The quel element is an interrogative or correlative element that introduces a vari-
able ranging over a domain of N-individuals. Indeed, Foulet (1919) underlines the
pervasive character of the combination of interrogative words with que to signal in-
determination in Old French. The que + S element is found in the subjunctive, as in
other similar constructions (Buridant, 2000, § 279, p. 350).28 Buridant’s presenta-
tion and corpus examples suggest that the quel N que structure has a universal-like
interpretation. Quer (1998, p. 202) claims that the subjunctive in free relatives may
convey some widening of the domain, like FCIs. Although the connection with FCIs
remains to be investigated in more detail, it can be argued that the use of the sub-
junctive signals a form of widening, so that the N-individuals under consideration
include individuals that occupy lowest or highest positions on some scale(s) of typ-
icality, relevance, appropriateness, etc. It is then reasonable to conjecture that the
concessive interpretation is a side-effect of the subjunctive mood, in some cases at
least.29
In Old French, one can find at least three different structures: quelN rel. pronoun,
as illustrated in (58), quelque N rel. pronoun, illustrated in (60), and quelque N,
illustrated in (61). Regarding the orientation of the scale, we observe that quel que
and quelque que could denote high values as well as low values. Example (59a)
above offers a clear case where the denoted value is unambiguously high.
27 The ‘//’ sign marks the end of a verse.
28 Christiane Marchello Nizia (p.c.) has drawn our attention to the fact that the verb of the subor-
dinate clause is not necessarily in the subjunctive form, pace Buridant.
29 Whether the concessive interpretation was grammaticalised or felt as an implicature in Old
French and subsequent stages is an open question.
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(60) qui tant a meffait que jamais n’est digne de estre amé, quelque vaillance qui
soit en lui [BFM, Chroniques et conquêtes de Charlemagne, David Aubert,
1458]
‘qui a si mal agi qu’il n’est jamais digne d’être aimé quelle que soit sa
vaillance’
‘who has behaved so badly that he does not deserve to be cherished, however
brave he is’
(61) car il n est pas hon qui ne peche, tourjorz a chascuns quelque teche [BFM,
Roman de la rose, Jean de Meun, between 1269 and 1278]
‘Car il n’y a pas d’homme qui ne pêche. Toujours chacun a une tache quel-
conque’
‘For there is no man without sin. Everybody has some stain’
There is little doubt that quelque and quel + que are semantically analogous,
but the details of their evolution are not clear. Combettes (2004), following Foulet
(1919), mentions for quel que the analogy with qui que, que que, etc. However, as
noted by Foulet, the main difficulty is to understand how such a construction gave
birth to a regular determiner quelque as in (61). Foulet proposes that the ‘creation’
of the quelque determiner is due to an extended use of a quasi-idiomatic expression
à quelque paine = à quelle peine que ce soit, with the meaning ‘whatever difficulty
it caused’. This paraphrase is not a retrospective fantasy, since an equivalent expres-
sion exists in the texts, e.g. Non obstant Helsis se sauva, a quelque paine que ce fust,
et entra dedens Brunebier (BFM, Chroniques et conquêtes de Charlemagne, David
Aubert, 1458), ‘In spite of that, Helsis escaped, however difficult it was, and entered
Brunebier’. Other similar expressions, such as à quelque ennui ‘with much pain’ or
à quelque meschief ‘with much misfortune’, can be found but they are much less
frequent. Foulet’s hypothesis is not impossible in view of the high frequency of à
quelque paine in our corpora, at a period (before 1350) where quelque did not seem
to be frequent as a full determiner. However, the reasons why this idiom emerged
and was so successful are rather obscure.
4.2 Main uses
We now turn to the main issue. How was quelque used in the period between 1200
and 1550? We focus on four points, which are particularly relevant to the problems
studied in the previous sections.
First, the concessive use is well-represented and is not very different from what
is found in subsequent stages of the French language, including the present stage.
Occurrences are more frequent after 1450, but earlier texts contain some of them,
e.g. (62).
(62) et encore ferons nous pis se nous ne tuons le roy, quelque asseurement
que nous li aions donné [BFM, Mémoires ou Vie de saint Louis, Jean de
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Joinville, 1307].
‘et nous ferons encore plus mal si nous ne tuons pas le roi, quelque assur-
ance que nous lui ayons donnée’
‘and we will act even more badly if we do not kill the king, whatever
promise we have made to him’
Second, quelque as a determiner becomes more and more frequent but can be
found already in early texts. Most interpretations are habitual, generic or ‘inten-
sional’ (i.e. in the scope of a modal operator). The different possibilities are illus-
trated below.
1. Iteration, habituality, etc.
(63) Male Bouche qui riens n’esperne trueve a chascune quelque herne [BFM,
Roman de la rose, Guillaume de Lorris, 1227].
‘Male Bouche, qui n’épargne rien, trouve à chacune un défaut quelconque’
‘Bad Mouth, who pardons nothing, finds some weakness in everybody’
2. Generic sentences:
(64) au temps que Fortune est amie de quelque homme et qu’elle l’a mis en aucun
estat, alors il trouvera de faulz amis sans nombre [BFM, Jean de Saintré,
Antoine de la Sale, 1456].
‘Dès que Fortune devient l’amie d’un homme quelconque et qu’elle l’a placé
dans une position sociale quelconque, il trouvera d’innombrables faux amis’
‘As soon as Fortune makes friend with some man and establishes him in
some social position, he will find innumerable false friends’
3. Purpose clauses
(65) Qant ce vint au quatrime jour, et que euls et lors cevaus furent tout rafresqi
et en grant volenté de ceminer avant pour trouver quelque aventures, il se
departirent [BFM, Chroniques, Jean Froissart, 1385]
‘Quand ce fut le quatrième jour et qu’eux-mêmes et leurs chevaux furent
entièrement reposés et très désireux d’avancer pour rencontrer une aventure
quelconque, ils partirent’
‘When the fourth day came and they and their horses had rested and they
desired to move forward in order to go through some adventure, they left’
4. Future possibilities
(66) a. et fault que malgré moi je me tiengne en ce lieu jusquez j’aye quelque
bonne nouvelle [BFM, Chevalier de la Charrette ou Lancelot, Chrétien
de Troyes, 1176]
‘Et, à mon corps défendant, je dois rester ici jusqu’a ce que je reçoive
une bonne nouvelle quelconque’
‘And, unwillingly, I must stay here until I have some good news’
b. Encores veul et vous commande que tous les jours de quelque Pater
noster ou autre oroison vous servez [BFM, Jean de Saintré, Antoine de
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la Sale, 1456].
‘De plus je veux et ordonne que vous disiez tous les jours quelque Pater
Noster ou quelque autre prière’
‘Moreover, I wand and command that you say some Pater Noster or
some other prayer everyday’
5. Conditional sentences
(67) si vous l’apportez en quelque lieu [BFM, Cent nouvelles nouvelles, un-
known author, 1462]
‘si vous l’apportez en un lieu quelconque’
‘If you bring it in some place’
These examples and many similar ones show that, as early as in the 12th century,
quelque was not necessarily concessive. Quelque N was an anti-specific indefinite
determiner used to refer to an undetermined individual satisfying the description
given by N. If the concessive use comes first, we conjecture that the anti-specific
use exploits directly the equivalence introduced by the concession. In the concessive
use, the individuals that satisfy a certain property P are ranked along a scale which
assigns to each one a certain plausibility to cause or facilitate a given state of affairs.
Then, their equivalence is the result of a well-known pragmatic implicature: if the
candidate that is the least likely to induce the state of affairs does so, so do the other
candidates. Under the anti-specificity regime, all P-individuals are equivalent, but
this does not follow from a scale-based implicature. Rather, all P-individuals are
equivalent with respect to some other property or some proposition. Equivalence
is primarily conceived in relation with the properties mentioned in the sentence.
However, certain examples show that, as early as around 1400, the ignorance value
emerges. Intuitively, this amounts to using the epistemic state of the speaker as the
source of a modal operator (68).
(68) Si s’en va et fait mauvese chiere, dont sa femme cognoist bien qu’il y a
quelque chose [BFM, Quinze joies de mariage, unknown author, 1400].
‘Cependant il s’en va et fait la tête, du coup sa femme se rend bien compte
qu’il y a un problème quelconque’
‘However he goes and makes a face, hence his wife realises that something
is wrong’
An additional (open) question is why the non-concessive determiner had only exis-
tential uses. The concessive structure made room for existential and universal inter-
pretations. For instance, in the following example, the preferred reading is clearly
universal.
(69) Franceis furent mult orgueillos, mult cruels e mult damagos, par quel que
leu que il passoent [BFM, Roman de Rou, Wace, c. 1170]
‘Les français furent extrêmement arrogants, cruels et nocifs dans tous les
lieux qu’ils traversaient’
‘The French were very arrogant, harsh and obnoxious wherever they went’
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This is never the case with the determiner. For instance, the clause Fortune est amie
de quelque homme, adapted from (64) cannot mean ‘Fortune makes friend with ev-
ery man’. This impossibility is expected if the determiner has an ignorance value,
since the truth of the generic sentences would entail the truth of the sentence for
every individual, thus contradicting the requirement of ignorance. However, this
seems to be also the case with the quelque N que ce soit form. There is no instance
of a generic sentence of the form P(quelque N que ce soit), where P is a property
assigned to every N-individual. We have no convincing explanation for this restric-
tion to existential values. The literature on FCIs shows that the general problem of
articulating or distinguishing between existential and universal readings is difficult
and a matter of dispute, see (Dayal, 2005; Giannakidou, 2001; Horn, 2001; Jayez
and Tovena, 2005, 2010b). In the case of quelque, it seems that, even in concessive
uses, the universal value is not possible in strictly episodic sentences, without any
iteration30 or habitual interpretation.
More work is needed to trace more precisely—if possible—the origin of the quelque
determiner and the reasons why it had only a restricted ability to quantify univer-
sally.
Finally, telling apart concessive structures and the determiner in these early
stages is not as easy a task as in modern French. We already saw that à quelque
painewas concessive and did not mean ‘with some pain’ but rather ‘however painful
it was’. As expected, the concessive structure can be used in the scope of negation
(70). A similar concessive use of bare quelque exists in the scope of negation, as
illustrated in (71). Other examples are more difficult to analyse and one can hesitate
between a ‘reduced’ concessive structure and a genuine anti-specific use.
(70) sans estre empeschiés, arestés ou molestés en quelque manière que ce soit
[BFM, Chronique, Enguerrand de Monstrelet, 1441]
‘sans être retenus, retardés ou importunés de quelque manière que ce soit’
‘without being held, delayed or troubled in any way’
(71) a. onques en nul sens ce n’avint qu’en si biau vergier n’ eûst huis ou
eschiele ou quelque pertuis [BFM, Roman de la rose, Guillaume de
Lorris, 1227]
‘Il n’est absolument jamais arrivé qu’un jardin aussi beau n’ait de porte
ou d’échelle ou aucune ouverture que ce soit’
‘It absolutely never happened that so beautiful a garden had no door,
no ladder or no opening whatsoever’
b. adviser que ne soiés devant quelque seigneur ou dame [BFM, Jean de
Saintré, Antoine de la Sale, 1456].
‘veiller à ne se placer devant aucun seigneur ou dame’
‘to avoid putting oneself before any lord or lady’
Anyway, it must be emphasised that we did not find any occurrence where quelque i)
is clearly anti-specific and not concessive and ii) is in the scope of a clausal negation
30 This is the interpretation of (69), where the verb passoent ‘went through’ has imperfective
morphology.
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or sans (‘without’). E.g. in (72) the concessive interpretation is by far the most
natural (‘without any injure, no matter how small it could be’).
(72) il se trouva tout sain et haittié de son corpz, sans avoir quelque essomte
[BFM, Roman du Comte d’Artois, unknown author, 1460]
‘Il s’aperçut qu’il était entièrement intact et en bonne santé, sans aucune
blessure’
‘He realised that he was entirely untouched and in good health, without any
injure’
Summarising, we have seen that quelque has most probably a concessive origin, in
which the notion of equivalence captured in (4) is central. The ignorance value is an
epistemic extension of it. We have presented a slightly more advanced stage of this
research in the paper (Jayez and Tovena, 2010a). However, it does not modify the
conclusions and questions mentioned in the present text.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the French determiner quelque can be analysed
using the general notion of equivalence in (4). This notion helped us to highlight
the connection between its concessive and epistemic uses and to locate it in the
family of FC and epistemic items. We have argued that the PPI-like distributional
profile of quelque can be explained by the epistemic implicature it carries and some
general processing principles. We have also laid the foundations for a diachronic
study of this determiner, which, in spite of its current limits, has already raised a
number of important points, including the concessive origin of the item, the rela-
tively early emergence of an anti-specific use and the difficult issue of the artic-
ulation/distinction between existential and universal interpretations. In subsequent
work, we intend to refine and extend the diachronic study, including in particular the
case of plural quelques, in order to gain a better understanding of the connections
between different modes of equivalence.
References
Aikhenvald, A. (2005). Evidentiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Alonso-Ovalle, L. and P. Menéndez-Benito (2003). Some epistemic indefinites. In
North-Eastern Linguistic Society 33, pp. 1–12.
Baker, C. L. (1970). Double negatives. Linguistic Inquiry 1, 169–186.
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, I. and M. Schlesewsky (2009). Processing Syntax and
Morphology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buridant, C. (2000). Grammaire Nouvelle de l’Ancien Français. Paris: Sedes.
Campbell, K. (1990). Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
30 Jacques Jayez and Lucia M. Tovena
Combettes, B. (2004). La grammaticalisation d’un déterminant indéfini: quelque en
Moyen Français. Scolia 18, 9–40.
Corblin, F. (2004). Quelque. In F. Corblin and H. de Swart (Eds.), The Handbook
of French Semantics, pp. 99–107. Stanford CA: CSLI Publications.
Corblin, F. and L. Tovena (2001). On the multiple expression of negation in Ro-
mance. In Y. D’Hulst, J. Rooryck, and J. Schroten (Eds.), Romance Languages
and Linguistic Theory 1999, pp. 87–115. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Corblin, F. and L. Tovena (2010). Negation in the simple clause in the Romance
languages. In D. Godard (Ed.), Fundamental issues in the Romance languages,
pp. 263–318. Stanford CA: CSLI Publications.
Culioli, A. (1982). A propos de quelque. In Actes du Colloque franco-bulgare de
linguistique. Contrastive Linguistics, pp. 49–58. reprinted in A. Culioli (Ed.),
Pour une linguistique de l’énonciation T.3, Paris: Ophrys, 1999.
Dayal, V. (2005). The universal force of free choice any. In Linguistic variation
yearbook, pp. 5–40. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
de Swart, H. (2010). Expression and Interpretation of Negation. Berlin: Springer.
Drenhaus, H., D. Saddy, and S. Frisch (2005). Processing negative polarity items:
When negation comes through the backdoor. In S. Kepser andM. Reis (Eds.), Lin-
guistic Evidence: Empirical, Theoretical, and Computational Perspectives, pp.
145–165. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Farkas, D. (2002). Varieties of indefinites. In Proceedings of Semantics and Lin-
guistic Theory XII, pp. 59–83.
Fauconnier, G. (1975). Pragmatic scales and logical structure. Linguistic Inquiry 6,
pp. 353–375.
Foulet, L. (1919). Quelque. Romania 45, pp. 220–249.
Gawron, J. M. (2001). Universal concessive conditionals and alternative NPs in En-
glish. In C. Condoravdi and G. Renardel de Lavalette (Eds.), Logical perspectives
on language and information, pp. 73–105. Stanford CA: CSLI Publications.
Giannakidou, A. (1998). Polarity Sensitivity as (Non)Veridical Dependency Ams-
terdam: John Benjamins.
Giannakidou, A. (2001). The meaning of free choice. Linguistics and Philoso-
phy 24, pp. 659–735.
Horn, L. R. (1972). On the Semantic Property of Logical Operators in English.
published by Indiana University Linguistics Club, University of California Los
Angeles.
Horn, L. R. (1989). The Natural History of Negation. Chicago: Chicago University
Press.
Horn, L. R. (2001). Any and (-)ever: Free choice and free relatives. In Proceedings of
the 15th Annual Conference of the Israeli Association for Theoretical Linguistics,
pp. 71–111.
Israel, M. (2001). Minimizers, maximizers and the rhetoric of scalar reasoning.
Journal of Semantics 18, pp. 297–331.
Jayez, J. and L. M. Tovena (2002). Determiners and (Un)certainty. In Proceedings
of Semantics and Linguistic Theory XII, pp. 164–183.
Scenarios of equivalence - The case of quelque 31
Jayez, J. and L. M. Tovena (2005). Free–Choiceness and Non Individuation. Lin-
guistics and Philosophy 28, pp. 1–71.
Jayez, J. and L. M. Tovena (2006). Epistemic determiners. Journal of Semantics 23,
pp. 217–250.
Jayez, J. and L. M. Tovena (2008). Evidentiality and determination. In A. Grønn
(Ed.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 12, pp. 271–286.
Jayez, J. and L. M. Tovena (2010a). Description et évolution de quelque. In L. M.
Tovena (Ed.), Déterminants en diachronie et synchronie, pp. 104–124. Paris:
Projet ELICO Publications.
http://elico.linguist.univ-paris-diderot.fr/
livre-elico.html
Jayez, J. and L. M. Tovena (2010b). Quatre problèmes pour le choix libre. Langue
française 166, pp. 51–72.
König, E. (1986). Conditionals, concessive conditionals and concessives: areas of
contrast, overlap and neutralization. In C. Traugott (Ed.), On conditionals, pp.
229–245. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kratzer, A. (2005). Indefinites and the operators they depend on. In G.C. Carlson
and F.J. Pelletier (Eds.), Reference and Quantification. The Partee Effect, pp. 113-
142. Stanford CA: CSLI Publications.
Lee, Y.-S. and L. Horn (1994). Any as indefinite plus even. ms. Yale University.
Maurin, A.-S. (2002). If Tropes. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Moltmann, F. (2007). Events, tropes, and truthmaking. Philosophical Studies 134,
pp. 363–403.
Potts, C. (2005). The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Quer, J. (1998). Mood at the interface. Ph. D. thesis, University of Utrecht.
Rawlins, K. (2008). (Un)conditionals: an investigation in the syntax and semantics
of conditional structures. Ph. D. thesis, University of California Santa Cruz.
Sauerland, U. (2008). Implicated presuppositions. In A. Steube (Ed.), The Discourse
Potential of Underspecified Structures, pp. 581–599. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Shan, C. (2004). Delimited continuations in natural language. Quantification and
polarity sensitivity. In H. Thielecke (Ed.), Proceedings of the 4th continuations
workshop, pp. 55-64.
Spector, B. (2007). Aspects of the pragmatics of plural morphology: On higher-
order implicatures In U. Sauerland and P. Stateva (Eds.), Presupposition and
Implicature in Compositional Semantics pp. 243-281. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Szabolcsi, A. (2004). Positive polarity – negative polarity. Natural Language and
Linguistic Theory 22, pp. 409–452.
Tredinnick, V. A. (2005). On the semantics of free relatives with -ever. Ph. D. thesis,
University of Pennsylvania.
Van de Velde, D. (2000). Les indéfinis comme adjectifs. In L. Bosveld, M. Van Pe-
teghem, and D. Van de Velde (Eds.), De l’indétermination à la qualification. Les
indéfinis, pp. 203–272. Arras: Artois Presses Université.
32 Jacques Jayez and Lucia M. Tovena
Vasishth, S., Brüssow, S., Lewis, R. and H. Drenhaus (2008). Processing polarity:
How the ungrammatical intrudes on the grammatical. Cognitive Science 32, 685–
712.
Vasishth, S. and R. Lewis (2006). Argument-head distance and processing com-
plexity: explaining both locality and entilocality effects. Language 82, 767–779.
von Fintel, K. (2000). Whatever. In Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory
X, pp. 27–39.
Williams, D. C. (1953). On the elements of being. Review of Metaphysics 7, pp.
3–18.
Zaefferer, D. (1991). Conditionals and unconditionals: Cross-linguistic and logical
aspects. In D. Zaefferer (Ed.), Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics, pp.
210–236. Amsterdam: Foris Publications.
Zwarts, F. (1995). Nonveridical contexts. Linguistic Analysis 25, pp. 286-312.
